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In games with costless preplay communication, some strategies are more complex
than others in the sense that they induce a finer partition of the set of states of
the world. This paper shows that if the concept of evolutionary stability, which is
argued to be a natural solution concept for communication games, is modified to
take lexicographic complexity pteferences into account, then for a class of games of
common interest only communication strategies that induce payoff-dominant Nash
outcomes oí the underlying game aze stable.
1 Introduction
Much of economic theory deals with coordination problems. The perhaps most basic is the
exploitation of potential gains from trade. In game-theoretic terms, this is the problem
of coordinating on a payoff-dominant equilibrium out of a larger set of equilibria. (Such
behavior is sometimes called cooperation.)
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If the players of a game are allowed to communicate before taking actions, we have
a strong intuition that they will achieve coordination. The subfield of cooperative game
theory is partly based on this intuition.
For a long time it seems to have been taken more or less for granted that explicit
modeling of communication opportunities would support the intuition as a formal result
in a straightforward manner. As it turns out, there are complications. The only immediate
effect of adding a preplay communication stage where costless, e g, verbal, messages can
be sent to a one-shot game is an expansion of the set of equilibrium outcomes to include
correlated equilibrium payoffs (see, e g, Wárneryd [17]).
Some authors (notably Farrell (6, 7]) have recently dealt with this by assuming the
messages have established meanings in some language held in common by the players.
If the players adhere to such meanings when there are no positive incentives not to, a
refinement of the set of equilibria may be the result. It is hard to see, however, how this
amounts to much more than assuming what is to be proved, namely that communication
allows the players to coordinate. The "semantic" approach begs the question of where
those meanings come from in the first place.
A less philosophically problematic approach sees meaning as an equilibrium property
oí messages at stationary states of some evolutionary or trial-and-error process. This line
of thinking was intuitively suggested in the early work of Crawford and Sobel [5], and is
formally developed in, e g, Kim and Sobel [9], hlatsui (10], and Wárneryd [16, 18].
The present paper falls in the latter category, but differs in applying the idea of
lexicographic complexity preferences in the spirit of Binmore and Samuelson [4]. There is
a natural complexity measure for "languagesr in the sense of these models. A language
is more complex the more finely it distinguishes between different possible messages, i e,
the more nuances it has. The intuition behind the results in this paper is that if such
complexity is costly, it can only be used to coordinate on efficient solutions. Anderlini [1]
also discusses complexity issues in the context of communication in coordination games,
but from the standpoint of perturbations of a priori restricted sets of strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model. The con-
cept of evolutionary stability is defined in Section 3, which also discusses evolutionary
approaches to communication games without complexity considerations. Section 4 in-3
troduces a complexity measure for the model, and discusses its motivation. A payoff
function that takes complexity into account in a lexicographic manner is constructed, and
evolutionary stability redefined in terms of it. Section 5 contains a result on efflciency
and stability (under the complexity-adjusted stability notion) in common interest games
where only pure communication strategies can be used. Finally, Section 6 warns the
reader that if mixed strategies are allowed, the result does not carry over. Furthermore,
in the population game setting implied by the use of notions of evolutionary stability,
there will always be asymmetric population distributions of inefficient strategies that can
persist.
2 Preliminaries
Let G be a two-player, symmetric normal form game with a finite set A of pure strategies
(actions) available to both players, and a payoff function u: A x A-~ ~2. If x-(a,a') E
A x A is an action profile of G, define i:- (a',a). Thus if u(y) is the payoff of one player
when the profile y is played, u(y) is the payoff of his opponent. Let N(G) denote the set
of pure strategy Nash equilibria of G.
~~'e shall consider games extended by a preplay communication stage where the players
simultaneously each send a costless message from the common finite message set ~1. The
messages are observed by both players before they play G. The messages are not assumed
to have any conventional meanings that enter into the deliberations of agents. The only
thing that distinguishes a message set is its number of elements. It is assumed throughout
that ~b1 ~ 1 2(where ~X~ denotes the number of elements, or cardinality, of a set X). Call
the communication-extended game G`.
A pure strategy of the reduced normal form of G' consists of a message m E M and a
function a : M--~ A that prescribes an action of G for every possible message sent by the
opponent. Let S be the set of pure strategies. Note that our construction implies that
we rule out self-inconsistent behavior. A player need not plan an action at information
sets other than those in which he has sent the signal specified by the strategy. One might
think that the possibility of místakes at the message stage should be allowed for. But we
shall think of strategies as minimal finite-state machines for playing G`. Such machines4
al a~
al 3, 3 0, 0
a~ 0,0 1,1
Figure 1: A game of common interest.
have no states for messages not sent by the strategy, and could therefore not send them
even by mistake.
We consider only pure strategies. The payoff function of the communication-extended
game is defined as U(ma, m'a') :- u(a(m'), a'(m)). However, we also need to define
pa}'offs to mixed strategies for use in defining evolutionary stability later. Let a: S~
[0,1] such that ~S o(s) - 1 be a mixed strategy. With no risk of confusion, we shall say
that U(o, o') :- ~S ~S v(s)o'(s')U(s, s').
The possibility of communication by itself does not guarantee cooperation if added
to a one-shot game. As an example, consider the game in Figure 1. This game exhibits
common intenest, a property that will be formally defined later but has an obvious meaning
here. Although it seems reasonable to think that players who could communicate would
be able to coordinate on the payoff-dominant (a~,al) equilibrium and rule out anything
else, communication of the fairly general form we have introduced here does not yield this
result. Consider a situation where both players play strategies mo: where a(m') - a2 for
all m'. This is a;V'ash equilibrium since a best reply to m~ can do no better than play az
when the opponent sends m, yielding the same inefficient expected payoff.
This general problem is sometimes expressed by saying that every game of costless
communication has ineffiicient "babbling" equilibria, where messages are ignored. It is
this problem in particular that motivates the approach taken in this paper.
3 Evolutionary Stability
Of course one should not expect players to be able to come to a one-shot game and
utilize abstract symbols, that have no prior established meanings, to coordinate. We
must study games that are played repeatedly. Repeated games, as such, are not what we
want, however. A repeated game is just one big game, and with communication it will5
suffer from the same problems as any other isolated game. To underatand the origin of
conventions of language that allow players to cootdinate, we must look at games that aze
played many times by different combinations of players and evolve over time, i e, we must
study evolutionary games.
A convenient way of doing this, that avoida complications associated with dealing with
explicit dynamical systems, is to apply the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy,
defined for a general game by Maynard Smith [11] as follows.
Definition 1 Let I' be a symmetric normal form two-player game with (miredJ strategy
set E and payoff function a: E x E~ i. A strntegy o' E E is said to be an evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS) of I' if for all o~ o'
a(o', a') ) a(~~ o`)~
or
~r(o',a') - a(v,o') and n(v',a) ~ n(o,v).
Think of the game as being played by a large population of players who are repeatedly
randomly matched in pairs. The criterion is then equivalent to requiring that, if all agents
play the ESS, a small invasion of agents playing some other strategy should do strictly
worse than the ESS players. That is, the above conditions are equivalent to saying there
exists b ~ 0 such that for all o~ o' and all e E(0, b),
1f(O'e (1 - e)O' ~ EQ) i lf(O, (1 - E)O'' ~ EU).
In biological game theory, the ESS notion is usually justified by reference to the fact
that an ESS is an asymptotically stable fixpoint of the so-called replicator dynamics, a
model of asexual genetic reproduction. (See, e g, Taylor and Jonker [14].) For economic
applications, we would rather think of the strategy population as evolving through a
process of learning or imitation. Clearly, however, the ESS concept is a reasonable notion
of stability also in such a setting. If anything, it is too strong a requirement. In many
games, an ESS fails to exist. ~i~'e shall therefore also use a weakening of the ESS conditions
called neutral stability, which only requires that a mutant does not do strictly better
against the perturbed population than does the incumbent. That is, a strategy o' will be6
said to be neutrally stable if there is á 1 0 such that for all Q~ o' and all E E(0, á), we
have that
7r(O~, (1 - E)O'} -~ EO) ~ 7r(O', (]. - E)O't ~ EO).
The effect of this is to weaken the second inequality of the equivalent two-part definition.l
We note that both al and az are ESSs of the game in Figure 1. So evolutionary
stability in itself is not enough to rule out inefficient play. However, Robson [12] suggests
that communication possibilities in combination with evolution will help. This is because
if communication possibilities are not utilized, a mutant that communicates with players
of its own type in order to coordinate on the ef6cient outcome could arise and eventually
reproduce to supplant the original population. Robson shows that in every game that has
an inefficient ESS it is possible to construct a mutant that recognizes its own type and
destabilizes the ineffiicient ESS.
A problem with Robson's approach is that it fails to consider the entire set of possible
mutants. Once you admit the idea of a signaling mutant, what is there to stop evolution
from introducing mutants that use the signal in other ways? For the analysis to be
complete, we must study the stability of efficiency-inducing mutants in a situation where
any kind of mutant could arise, i e, in the general setting described in the previous section.
Such an inquiry gives a limited positive result.
Proposition 1 Let G be a 2 x 2 game of the form
a~ ay
al uy, uH 0, 0
az O,O uL,uL
v;here uy ~ uL ~ 0. Then s is a neutrnlly stable pune strategy of the communication-
extended game G' if and only if U(s,s) - uy.
A proof is given in Wàrneryd [18].
This result does not extend beyond the class of 2 x 2 games, however. To see why,
consider the counterexample of the game in Figure 2.
iThere is a dynamic justification also for neutrally stable strategies. Weibull [19] shows that they are
Lyapunov-stable fixpoints of the replicator dynamic. Similar results are discussed in Thomas [15].7
a~ ay a3
al 3,3 0,0 0,0
a~ 0,0 2,2 0,0
a3 0, 0 U, U 1,1
Figure 2: A counterexample.
Consider the strategy mla of the communication-extended game such that
az if m - m~
a(m) - {
a3 otherwise.
This is a neutrally stable strategy since any alternative best reply to mla must also send
m~ (otherwise it could get at most a payoff of 1) and respond with az to ml. But then
it also gets a payoff of 2 when it meets itself. So mla sustains an inef6cient payoff by
threatening to do something even worse.
However, it could be argued that m~a is an unnecessarily complicated way of getting
a payoff of 2. ~'ou could get that by not bothering to distinguish between messages at all
and just responding with az to everything.
Consider a population where everybody plays mla. A mutant could arise that also
sends ml but then always plays aZ regardless of the message sent by the opponent. Since
the mutant gives rise to the same payoff, it seems reasonable to think that the population
distribution could drift over to favor the mutant. But then a population dominated by
the mutant could be invaded by a strategy that sends a different message and plays al
against itself.
A form of thís argument is the basis for the set-valued stability notion approaches of
Kim and Sobel [9] and Matsui [10]. In the following, we shall explore a slightly different
approach that takes complexity considerations into account explicitly. The drifting away
of inefí'iciency-inducing strategies will be assumed to happen because evolution directly
favors less complex strategies.8
4 Complexity
In general, any strategy or decision rule can be viewed as a function from some set f2
of states of the world to a set of actions. Such a function induces a partition of f2 into
equivalence classes of states of the world that induce the play of the same action. The
degree of complexity of a strategy will here be identified with the fineness of its implicit
partition of the set of states of the world. This reflects the idea that a strategy is more
complicated and costly the more different ways it has of conditioning on past events, or,
put differently, the more detailed is the information it requires.
The application of complexity measures is perhapa best known from the theory of
repeated games, and the most common measure is that of the number of states required
by the unique minimal deterministic finite-state machine (henceforth, DFM)~ that im-
plements the strategy (see, e g, Rubinstein [13]). This measure is shown by Kalai and
Stanford [8] to be equivalent to the definition given above given a suitable definition of
the state space. In particular, the definition utilizes the recursive nature of repeated game
histories.
For the present application, the minimal DFM that implements a given strategy of
the communicatíon game has a trivial structure. In fact, given the way strategies have
been specified above, a strategy may be directly identified with its minimal machine
implementation. Consider the strategy s- ma. The minimal machine has an initial
output state outputting the message m, and then transits to final output states as a
function of an opponent's message input according to a, which may thus be regarded as
a transition function. The final output states correspond to the actions in the range of
a. A minimal machine implementation of e therefore has 1 f ~a(,1I)~ states. Disregarding
the initial output state that every machine has to have, we shall call c(ma) :- ~a(M)~
the complexity of ma. Clearly, the least complexity a strategy could have is 1, which
corresponds to playing the same action regardless of the opponent's message, and the
greatest is min{~A~, ~fb7~}, which corresponds to discriminating perfectly between different
messages sent by the opponent.
~In the following I assume some very limited familiarity with the theory of finite-state machines. Such
knowledge is not necessary to understand any of the resulta of this paper, however.9
We now modify the payoffs to take into account the complexity of a strategy in a
lexicographic manner. Let U` be the complexity-adjusted payoff function. We shall say
that
1. U`(s, s') 1 U`(s", s') if U(s, s') ~ U(s", s') or if U(s, s') - U(s", s') and c(s) G c(s").
It follows that
2. U`(s, s') ~ U`(s", s') if U(s, s') ~ U(s", s') or if U(s, s') - U(s", s') and c(s) c c(s").
We now wish to incorporate these complexity-adjusted preferences into a notion of evo-
lutionary stability. A major problem with the strength of the ESS criterion is that, in
general, an ESS does not always exist. In particular, the games considered here typically
fail to have an ESS in pure strategies. This is because as a consequence of the lexico-
graphic complexity preferences a necessary requirement for stability will turn out to be
that a strategy has complexity 1, i e, that it always plays the same action. But then any
other strategy that also always plays the same action, but sends a different initial message,
will be an alternative best reply that dces as well against itself as the first strategy does
against it.
Since it seems reasonable not to care about the distinction between strategies that
in effect behave alike when faced with one another and can thus stably coexist, we shall
consider strategies that are neutrally stab]e in terms of the lexicographic complexity-
adjusted payoff function instead. We therefore require oí a strategy s for it to be considered
stable that for every s' ~ s there exist ó~ 0 such that for all E E(0, ó),
U`(s, ( I - E)S ~ ES') ~ U`(s', ( I - E)3 ~ Es').
This is the case if either
(1 - E)U(s, s) f EU(s, s') 1(1 - E)U(s', s) f EU(s', s') for all E E(0, ó)
or
(1 - E)U(s,s) -~ EU(s,s') - (1 - E)U(s',s) f EU(s',s') and c(s) G c(s') for all E E(O,ó).
The following equivalent definition is easier to apply in practice.3
3This is the same thing, except o[course for the difference in the intended application, as what Binmore
and Samuelson [4] call a modified evolutionary stable strntegy. Also, the exact motivation for the concept
is slightly unclear from their papet.10
Definition 2 A strategy s of G' is said to 6e neutrally stable with respect to U` (c-stable)
if for all s' ~ s
or
or
U(s, s) 1 U(s', s)
U(s, 9) - U(9', 9) and U(9, 9') i U(s', 9')
U(s,s) - U(s',s) and U(s,s') - U(s',s') and c(s) C c(s').
Observe that with a lexicographic utility function there is no longer an equivalence
between the two-part definition of a neutrally stable strategy and the definition in terms of
stability in the face of a small invasion of mutants. Furthermore, a c-stable strategy is not
necessarily in Nash equilibrium with itself in terms of the lexicographic utility function.
We note that if a strategy is an ESS in ordinary payoff terms alone, it satisfies the
first two conditions and is c-stable.
The following result is immediate.
Proposition 2 IJs is a c-stable strategy of G', then c(s) - 1.
PROOF. Let s- ma be some strategy with c(s) ~ 1. Consider the alternative best
reply s' - mo' such that cr'(m') - a(m) for all m'. We have that U(s', s') - U(s, s') -
U(s', s) - U(s, s), but c(s') - 1 G c(s), so s is not c-stable. O
Note that this means that c-stable strategies are necessarily of the "babbling" kind,
where in effect no communication takes place. Yet, as we shall see below, the potentia!
for effective communication in the model forces efFicient behavior in some types of games.
There is a similarity to the results of Ben-Porath and Dekel [3], who do not study cost-
less- communication, but allow players to "burn money,T i e, unilaterally decrease their
expected utility, before a game is played. In pure coordination games, the strategies
that survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies induce efficient outcomes
without any money actually being burnt.11
5 Common Interest
Aumann and Sorin [2~ discuss a class of games that have a unique payoff profile that
strictly dominates all other feasible payoff profiles. The following definition utilizes the
fact that in a symmetric game, such a payoff profile if it exists must give both players the
same payoff.
Definition 3 G is said to be a game of common interest if there is u such that u(x) -
u(~) - u for some x E A x A, andfor ally E A x A, if (u(y), u(y)) ~(u, u), then u(y) G u
and u(y) C u.
It should be stressed that an obvious necessary condition for the existence of a c-stable
strategy is that G has a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Accordingly, the following
result does not guarantee existence of a c-stable strategy.
Proposition 3 If G is a game of common interest and ihere is x E A x A such that
u(x) - u and x- y, then a strategy s of G' is c-stable if and only if U(s, s) - u and
c(s) - 1.
PROOF. To prove the "ifr part, let s- ma be such that U(s, s) - u and c(s) - 1.
Clearly, no strategy can do strictly better against s. Let s' be an alternative best reply to
s. We have that U(s', s) - u. Since G is a game of common interest, where if one player
gets u so does his opponent, we have that U(s, s') - U(s', s) - u. Then since u~ U(s', s')
and c(s') ? 1, s is c-stable.
To prove the "only ifn part, we start by noting that by Proposition 2 s cannot be
c-stable if c(s) ~ 1. So we need only consider strategies of complexity 1. Let s be such
that c(s) - 1, but U(s, s) C u. We can find an alternative best reply s' - m'a' such
that m' ~ m, a'(m) - a(m') - a(m), and u(a'(m'), a'(m')) - u. Since U(s', s') - u 1
U(s, s') - U(s, s), s is not c-stable. O
6 Caveat
If mixed strategies are allowed, the efficiency result from the previous section does not
hold anymore. As an example of this, consider again the game in Figure 1. Let the12
communication-extended game have a message set consisting of two messages, ml and
mZ. Consider the two pure strategies sl - mla~ and sz - mza~ such that
- (a~ ifm-m1
a~(m) (l
al if m- mz,
and
az if m - m~.
Now construct a mixed strategy o that plays sl and sz with equal probability. We have
that U(o, o) - 2.
Regardless of how we choose to define a complexity measure for mixed strategies, o
cannot be destabilized, because it is an ESS already strictly in payoff terms. This means
complexity considerations will not even enter the picture.
To see that o is an ESS, consider alternative best replies to o. Clearly, any alternative
best reply must after having sent ml behave like s~, and after having sent mz like s2.
So let o' be a probability mix of sl and s2 different from that of o. We have that
U(o', ó) C U(o, ó) - 2, so o is an ESS.
This problem extends also to the pure-strategy case if the random-matching story
underlying the use of the stability concept is taken seriously. Then even if only pure
strategies can be played, there are stable asymmetric population distributions of strategies
that induce inefficient outcomes. As an example, consider a population faced with the
game discussed above where half of the agents play sl and halí play s~. In complete
analogy with the mixed strategy case, no strategy can invade such a population.
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